We design multi-unit auctions for budget-constrained bidders in the Bayesian setting. Our auctions are supplymonotone, which allows the auction to be run online without knowing the number of items in advance, and achieve asymptotic revenue optimality. We also give an efficient algorithm for implementing our auction by using a succinct and efficiently implementable characterization of supplymonotonicity in the Bayesian setting.
Introduction
Dobzinski et al. [17] initiated the study of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders, where multiple indivisible units of an item are sold to a set of bidders with private valuations whose spending is constrained by a budget limit. They showed that if the budgets are public information, then an adaptation of Ausubel's clinching auction [2] is incentive-compatible and achieves Pareto-optimal outcomes. In many real world settings, such as in Internet advertising, multiunit auctions need to be run online, where in each step, a new unit of the item has to be sold without knowing the total number of units available. To address this situation, Goel et al. [18] showed that the adaptive clinching auction is, in fact, a supply-monotone auction, which implies that the allocation to a bidder is monotonically non-decreasing as the supply increases. Both these results apply to the worst case setting, where the valuations of individual bidders can be arbitrary. A more commonly studied setting is that of Bayesian valuations, i.e., where bidders' valuations are drawn identically and independently from a fixed distribution. In this paper, we study the problem of designing a supply-monotone, multi-unit auction for Bayesian bidders.
The first hurdle is to define supply-monotonicity in the Bayesian setting, which requires that the expost mechanism is monotonically non-decreasing as the supply increases for any possible valuation profile.
However, an ex-post mechanism requires exponentially many values to be specified. For single unit auctions, this problem is circumvented by considering the interim mechanism, which specifies the expected allocation for a bidder given her valuation. In a seminal work, Border [6] obtained a succinct mathematical characterization of feasible interim mechanisms, i.e., which can be generated by an ex-post mechanism, for independent and identical bidders. This was later extended to independent (but possibly non-identical) bidders in Border [7] (see also Che et al. [14] for a network flow formulation).
From a computational perspective, Cai et al. [9] developed an efficient algorithm to check feasibility of an interim mechanism, and additionally demonstrated that any feasible mechanism can be represented by a distribution over polynomially many hierarchical mechanisms. They also designed an efficient algorithm to implement a feasible mechanism by efficiently sampling a hierarchical mechanism.
Our first contribution is to extend the above literature from single-unit auctions to multi-unit, supplymonotone auctions. The latter is complicated by the fact that there are non-trivial correlations between allocation rules for individual units. We provide:
A succinct characterization of feasible interim supply-monotone mechanisms, and efficient algorithms to verify and implement such mechanisms.
This characterization allows us to circumvent the exponentially large valuation space, and specify our expost mechanism succinctly and implement the mechanism efficiently.
Next, we turn to the question of maximizing revenue for a supply-monotone, multi-unit auction with Bayesian valuations. For offline auctions, i.e., if the supply were known in advance and we do not require supply-monotonicity, Laffont and Robert [19] and Pai and Vohra [24] characterized revenue-maximizing multiunit auctions in the Bayesian setting for symmetric budget-constrained bidders.
1 (A set of bidders is symmetric if their valuations are i.i.d. and budgets are identical.) However, if the supply is unknown, applying the optimal offline auction to every supply violates supply monotonicity. In this case, we say that a supplymonotone auction has competitive ratio τ if it always generates at least τ fraction of the revenue of a revenuemaximizing offline auction. Our second contribution is to provide a supply-monotone auction that achieves a tight competitive ratio:
An efficient algorithm for computing a Bayesian incentive-compatible, supply-monotone auction for symmetric budget-constrained bidders that achieves the best possible competitive ratio.
Interestingly, we show that the offline optimal auction satisfies the supply-monotonicity property asymptotically as the number of bidders becomes large, which implies that the competitive ratio of our supplymonotone auction goes to 1 asymptotically.
Techniques.
In the case of a single unit, feasible interim mechanisms are characterized by a set of inequalities defined on subsets of valuations. The main complication of the multi-unit setting over a single unit is the correlation between the allocation rules for individual units. Thus, applying the characterization of feasibility from the single unit case to each individual unit in the multi-unit setting is not sufficient. Instead, we use a hierarchy of subsets of valuations, in which the subset of valuations of the current supply is a superset of the subset of valuations of the next supply, and show that a set of inequalities over all possible hierarchies can characterize feasible supply-monotone interim allocations. To establish necessity of these conditions, we generalize the probabilistic argument over subsets of valuations to the hierarchies. As for sufficiency, we provide a generalization of the network flow approach from Che et al. [14] that is carefully tailored to handle the interdependencies between units, and show that feasibility can be characterized by a duality condition on this network. However, our flow network being exponential in size, it does not permit efficient verification or implementation of the auction. To overcome this hurdle, we show that any interim supply-monotone allocation can be represented by a combination of interim allocation rules for individual units of the item. This allows us to reduce the verification and implementation of feasible supply-monotone allocation rules to the corresponding problems for individual units of the item, which can be solved in polynomial time.
apply their result by treating multiple units of an item as a single unit.
In order to obtain revenue-maximizing supplymonotone auctions, we first acquire a better understanding of the structure of optimal offline auctions. Typically, such auctions are described as optimal solutions to linear programming formulations. Instead, we give a more transparent view of these auctions, where we provide a novel characterization of the gradient of the allocation rules in optimal offline auctions with the change in supply. In particular, we show that there are only two categories of gradients, which leads to only polynomially many different gradients in terms of the number of valuations. This characterization allows us to enumerate over these possibilities to design a supplymonotone auction with a tight competitive ratio.
1.2 Related Work. The problem of selling items online to maximize revenue has a long and rich history, particularly in the context of selling advertising slots or impressions to prospective advertisers in Internet search engines. The traditional approach in this literature has been to optimize revenue in the presence of budget constraints but without strategic considerations, pioneered by the AdWords problem due to Mehta et al. [22] which has led to a large volume of subsequent research (see the survey by Mehta [21] ). In contrast, the traditional setting in auction theory captures strategic behavior but does not consider budget constraints. Recent literature in Ad auctions seeks to overcome these limitations by including budget constraints as an essential feature, and investigate its impact on auction design [1, 8, 18] .
When auctions need to be run online, the overall supply is not known in advance. This requires that the auction satisfies the supply-monotonicity property, i.e., increasing the overall supply does not decrease the allocation to any bidder. The study of auctions with supply monotonicity was initiated by Mahdian and Saberi [20] . They provide a constant competitive auction with the optimal offline single-price revenue. Babaioff et al. [3] study online supply-monotone auctions for unit-demand bidders with the objective of maximizing social welfare. They show that all truthful mechanisms achieve a diminishing fraction of the optimal social welfare in the adversarial setting, where the supply might be arbitrary, and however, they present a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant approximation in the stochastic model, where the distribution of the supply is known. All these results are obtained in an nonBayesian environment. Devanur and Hartline [15] describes the Bayesian optimal mechanism for the online supply-monotone setting and extend their discussion to prior-free cases.
A different direction of research, initiated by Che and Gale [12] (see also Benoit and Krishna [4] , Che and Gale [13] ), has investigated mechanism design with budget constraints in non-Bayesian settings. In a seminal work, Dobzinski et al. [17] show that in multi-unit settings, if the budgets are private, there is no Pareto optimal and incentive compatible mechanism, and for public budgets they demonstrate that an adaptive clinching auction is the unique mechanism that is Pareto optimal and incentive compatible, which was later extended to divisible units by Bhattacharya et al. [5] . Goel et al. [18] show that the adaptive clinching auction satisfies the supply-monotonicity property.
Another consideration that has received substantial attention is revenue maximization for the seller. The revenue-maximizing mechanism for independent buyers without budget constraints is characterized by the celebrated Myerson's auction [23] . Pai and Vohra [24] characterize revenue-maximizing auctions for budgetconstrained bidders. Chawla et al. [11] provide constant factor approximations for both social welfare and revenue for budget-constrained bidders. Recently, Devanur and Weinberg [16] characterize the revenue-maximizing mechanism for a single buyer with private budget in a general setting.
Our work also extends the line of work that characterizes the feasibility of a reduced form auction. In a celebrated work, Border [6] provided the first characterization of a reduced form auction for identical and independent bidders. Cai et al. [9] extended these results to obtain a characterization of feasible, Bayesian, multi-item, multi-bidder mechanisms with independent, additive bidders as distributions over hierarchical mechanisms. Later, Cai et al. [10] generalized the results to other feasibility constraints of the interim allocation rule via a reduction to virtual welfare maximization 2 . Che et al. [14] provides a network flow interpretation of feasible reduced form auction that we also use in our work.
Preliminaries

The environment.
We denote the number of bidders by n and the total supply by S, which is unknown to the bidders and the seller. Each bidder has a private valuation
3 For convenience and without loss of generality, we take ε = 1 throughout the paper. Moreover, we consider a single-parameter setting with symmetric 2 Due to the estimation of the virtual welfare in the reduction, directly applying their results provides an algorithm to check whether the interim allocation is approximately supply-monotone, i.e., the allocation rule only violates the supply-monotone constraints by a small constant, but it does not provide an efficient algorithm to verify supply monotonicity exactly.
3 Such discretization is standard in the literature, e.g., in Pai and Vohra [24] .
bidders: their valuations are drawn identically and independently from a commonly known distribution f = f i over V and their budgets, denoted B, are identical and public. In line with the literature, we require that f satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition:
is monotonically increasing. Before the arrival of the first unit, each bidder i draws her valuation v i from distribution f and reports a valuationv i to the seller, which collectively form a valuation profile v = (v 1 , · · · ,v n ). The valuation profile remains unchanged during the auction. When the s-th unit arrives, given the valuation profile v, an allocation rule x s i (v) specifies the number of units that bidder i receives from the first s units and a payment rule χ s i (v) gives the amount that bidder i should pay to the seller. The utility for bidder i under a reported valuation profile v is u
As usual, we use −i to represent bidders other than i.
Supply monotonicity requires that the ex-post allocation rule must be monotonically non-decreasing for all possible valuation profiles. In other words, the seller cannot retrieve a previously allocated unit during the auction. 
Remark: Our definition corresponds to the weak online supply model [18] where the seller is allowed to charge the payments only at the end, or equivalently, reimbursements to the bidders is allowed if necessary. 
Given the number of bidders and the distribution over the valuations, Border [6, 7] characterizes the space of feasible interim allocation rules for a single unit by a set of linear inequalities. 
Intuitively, Border's theorem states that an interim allocation rule is feasible if and only if for every set of valuations V , the probability that a bidder with valuation in set V receives the item must be less than or equal to the probability that at least one bidder has valuation in set V . The necessity of this condition is obvious, but sufficiency is non-trivial. Although there are exponentially many linear constraints in this theorem, Border [6] points out that it suffices to check only a linear number of constraints:
Note that given an allocation rule a(·), there are at most |V | different sets E β . Therefore, we can check the feasibility of an interim allocation rule in polynomial time.
Bayesian IC and IR.
To incentivize bidders to participate in the auction and report truthfully, we require the auction satisfies Bayesian individual rationality (BIR) and Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) for all supplies.
Myerson [23] provides a simple characterization of interim allocation rules and payment rules that ensure that the auction satisfies both BIC and BIR properties. 
Moreover, the expected revenue is given by n ·
Feasible Interim Allocation Rule for Supply-Monotone Auctions
In this section, we characterize and give an efficient implementation of feasible interim allocation rules for supply-monotone, multi-unit auctions with i.i.d. bidders. Our characterization is for the general supplymonotone, multi-unit auctions, so that it does not depend on the budget constraints. The budget constraints will be incorporated in Section 4. We note that the results of this section can be extended to identical but not independent bidders. We give this extension in Appendix A. We first provide a mathematical characterization of feasibility in Section 3.1; in Section 3.2, we show how to efficiently check feasibility; and finally, we discuss how to efficiently implement a supply-monotone auction in Section 3.3.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Feasibility. We say an interim allocation rule a s (·) with 1 ≤ s ≤ S is feasible if there exists a corresponding ex-post allocation rule x s (·) that satisfies supply monotonicity. The following theorem gives necessary and sufficient conditions for feasibility:
This theorem extends Border's theorem for a single unit (Theorem 2.1) to the multi-unit setting. For a single unit, the Border's theorem characterizes a necessary and sufficient condition via a set of inequalities over subsets of valuations. In a multi-unit setting, in order to capture the relationship between different units, we introduce a hierarchy of subsets
in which the subset of the current supply is a superset of the subset of the next supply.
To prove Theorem 3.1, we first replace Eq. (3.1) by a slightly more involved but equivalent characterization.
) holds if and only if for all i and V
For the only-if direction, notice that from Eq. (3.1), summing over bidders, we have
Due to the fact that the arithmetic mean is at least the geometric mean, we have for any
and therefore, we have
We now show that a monotonically non-decreasing interim allocation rule is supply-monotone if and only if for all i and V
Only-if direction. Let x s i (·) be the ex-post supplymonotone allocation rule that induces a s (·). For the convenience, we assume a 0 (·) = 0 and let
Let us randomly select a valuation profile v such that v i is independently drawn from distribution f , and define s max = max i g i (v i ). Bidder i is given a lottery that provides s max units with probability x gi(vi) i (v)/s max and 0 units with probability 1 − x gi(vi) i (v)/s max . Then, the expected number of allocated units for bidder i is
Note that the summation of the last formula over bidders is equivalent to the LHS of Eq. (3.2). Next, consider another random process: (1) randomly select a valuation profile v such that v i is independently drawn according to distribution f ; (2) generate s max = max i g i (v i ) units, i.e., for each s ∈ {1, · · · , S}, if there exists i such that g i (v i ) ≥ s, then generate 1 unit. Therefore, the expected number of generated units is
which is the RHS of Eq. (3.2).
Since x(·) is supply-monotone, we have is a valid ex-post allocation rule for supply s max . Therefore, the number of units generated by the first random process, which corresponds to the LHS of (3.2) , is at most the number of units generated by the second random process. This concludes the only if direction.
If direction. The proof of this direction is based on the max-flow min-cut theorem. We form a six-layer s-t flow network (see Figure 1 ). The first layer has the source source and the last layer has the sink sink. In the second layer, vertex source s corresponds to the source on supply s and there exists an arc (source, source s ) with capacity ∞ for each vertex source s . Moreover, in the fifth layer, vertex sink s corresponds to sink on supply s and there exists an arc (sink s , sink) with capacity ∞ for each vertex sink s .
In the third layer X, vertex (s, v) ∈ X corresponds to supply s and a possible valuation profile v. For each (s, v), there exists an arc (source s , (s, v)) with capacity i f (v i ). We slightly abuse the notation to define
Since f is a probability distribution, the total outgoing capacity from source s is 1. Moreover, for each s < S and valuation profile v, there exists an arc ((s, v), (s + 1, v)) with capacity ∞.
In the fourth layer Y , vertex (s, i, v i ) ∈ Y corresponds to supply s, bidder i, and valuation
Finally, there exists a special vertex noSell in the fourth layer and for each vertex (S, v) in the third layer, there exists an arc ((S, v), noSell) with capacity ∞. Finally, we add an arc (noSell, sink S ) with capacity S − i vi∈V f (v i )a S (v i ). We show that once a s i (·) satisfies inequality (3.2), the max-flow/min-cut of the constructed network is at least S. Note that the maximum possible flow of the constructed network is S since there are totally 1 outgoing capacity from each source s and the summation of all incoming capacity for sink s is exactly S. Moreover, once the network has full flow, we can construct the expost allocation rule by setting (x
To show the capacity of the min-cut is at least S, we argue that the capacity of any cut is at least S. Consider an arbitrary cut (L, L) without any arc with ∞ capacity. Since the capacity of arcs (source, source s ) and (sink s , sink) are ∞, we have source s ∈ L and sink s ∈ L for all s. Therefore, the cut is constituted by the edges between {source s } and L ∩ X in the third layer, and the edges between L ∩ Y in the fourth layer and {sink s }. Moreover, if noSell ∈ L, then for all (s, v) ∈ X, (s, v) ∈ L. Thus, the capacity of the cut is exactly S. From now on, we consider the case when noSell ∈ L.
Let 
. Henceforth, the total ca-
which is the RHS of the inequality (3.2).
The total capacity between L∩Y in the fourth layer and
which is S minus the LHS of the inequality (3.2). Since we assume that the LHS is less than or equal to the RHS, we have the total capacity of the cut is at least S.
Efficient Verification of Feasibility.
In Theorem 3.1, we gave an exponential set of inequalities that source source1 source2
. . .
2, n, vn
. . . 
for all i, s, and k;
for all i and s.
Proof. Intuitively, given a valuation profile v, we construct y Formally, we first partition the valuation profile into groups such that for valuation profile v and v , if there exists a permutation π : 
Since y
is the same for all buyers with the same valuation and we let γ
Therefore, an interim allocation a s (·) can be represented by a In other words, it must be a feasible solution to LP (Supply-monotone). In fact, we show that this is not only a necessary condition but also a sufficient one, i.e., every feasible solution to LP (Supply-monotone) yields a feasible interim allocation rule.
. We want to create a supply-monotone ex-post allocation rule 
Therefore, by the fact that changing
Although there are exponentially many constraints in this linear program, by Theorem 2.2, we can construct an efficient separation oracle to identify a violating constraint. Therefore, we can determine whether a monotonically non-decreasing interim allocation rule is supply-monotone in O(poly(|V |, S)) time.
(Supply-monotone) [9] show that an interim allocation rule for a single unit can be represented by a convex combination of |V | + 1 hierarchical mechanisms.
Definition 3.1. (Hierarchical Mechanisms)
A hierarchical mechanism consists of a function
for all i, the mechanism throws the unit away; otherwise, the unit is awarded uniformly at random to a bidder in arg max i H(v i ).
We generalize their definition to supply-monotone hierarchical mechanisms.
Definition 3.2.
A supply-monotone hierarchical mechanism consists of a set of functions H s that maps V to {0, · · · , |V |} and G s that maps V to {1, · · · , S} for the s-th unit. On bid vector (v 1 , · · · , v n ), for the s-th unit, if H s (v i ) = 0 for all i, the mechanism throws the unit away; otherwise, the unit is divided uniformly at random to bidders in arg max i H s (v i ) and allocated to bidder i when the G s (v i )-th unit arrives.
A supply-monotone hierarchical mechanism is a hierarchical mechanism that defers allocations based on bidders' valuations. When the s-th unit appears, the mechanism computes how to allocate the unit according to the function H s . However, the actual allocation only happens when the G s (v i )-th unit appears in the future.
Theorem 3.3.
A supply-monotone mechanism can be represented by a convex combination of at most |V | · S 2 + 1 supply-monotone hierarchical mechanisms.
Proof. Similar to the ex-post allocation rule, we can decompose the interim allocation rule a s (·) as a
represents the expected number of units that a bidder receives from the k-th unit when the supply is s. Let π k : {1, · · · , |V |} → V be an ordering over V such that for all 1 ≤ j < |V |,
is feasible if and only if
Consider the following set of feasibility constraints:
Notice that γ r (·, ·) is inside this polytope. Cai et al. [9] demonstrates that for any corner of the polytope, θ S (k, ·) corresponds to a hierarchical mechanism. As for θ s (k, π k (j)) with s < S, at a corner of the polytope, there must exists a
. Therefore, any corner of the polytope corresponds to a supply-monotone hierarchical mechanism. Finally, since there are totally |V |·S An efficient algorithm to sample a supply-monotone hierarchical mechanism can be obtained by applying the algorithm developed by Cai et al. [9] for the single unit case. As for the payment, we can maintain BIC and BIR by simply charging the interim payment p s (v) for a bidder with valuation v no matter which supplymonotone hierarchical mechanism is sampled.
Online Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders
The previous section allows us to focus on feasible interim allocation rules when designing a supplymonotone auction. In this section, we design an algorithm to compute a revenue-maximizing supplymonotone auction for symmetric budget constrained buyers. Laffont and Robert [19] and Pai and Vohra [24] characterized the optimal auction for symmetric budget constrained buyers with known supply. They showed that the revenue-maximizing auction OP T a s (·) corresponding to supply s is the optimal solution of the following linear program (RevOpt). This LP encodes a revenue-maximizing feasible interim mechanism, which also satisfies incentive compatibility and budget constraints. In particular, by Lemma 2.3, the interim allocation rule must be monotone, i.e., a s (v) ≤ a s (v + 1) for all v ∈ V . Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, possible choice of E β are {v ∈ V | v ≥ v} for all v.
We consider the setting where the total supply S is unknown to the bidders and the seller, and design a supply-monotone auction with a tight competitive ratio. 
By Theorem 3.2 and 3.3, one can simply compute an auction with optimal competitive ratio by a linear program to optimize the competitive ratio τ . Assuming the maximum possible supply is S, we can obtain a linear program LP (Supply-monotone RevOpt) by replacing the Border's constraints in LP (RevOpt) with the supply-monotone constraints in LP (Supplymonotone) and introducing an additional constraint to track the competitive ratio.
However, the complexity of solving this LP depends on the (possibly unknown) supply S, which could be exponentially large compared to the number of valuations |V |. To alleviate this problem, we show there are only O(|V |) critical supply values that must be included in the LP. Our main tool is a novel characterization of the gradient of the optimal offline allocation rule OP T a s (·). For convenience, we assume OP T a s (0) = 0 for all s.
Gradient Characterization.
Consider the gradient of the optimal interim allocation rule:
Note that if for all s ∈ R + , g s (·) satisfies the Border's theorem (Theorem 2.1), then OP T a s (·) is supplymonotone. Motivated by this observation, we explore how the gradients violate Theorem 2.1. Note that until the supply is large enough to make the budget constraint tight in the optimal solution, the optimal auction is essentially Myerson's auction [23] on a single unit multiplied by the supply. Therefore, at this stage, the gradient is the interim allocation rule of Myerson's auction. Let s B be the supply when the budget constraint becomes tight for the first time.
The following lemma provides an LP that characterizes the gradients for s ≥ s B . 
Proof. We first show that if a(·) is a feasible solution to the LP (OPTGrad), then there exists ∆ > 0 such that for all 0 < ∆ < ∆, OP T a s (·) + ∆ · a(·) is a feasible solution to the LP (RevOpt) on supply s + ∆. Let 
n , i.e., a(·) violates the Border's constraint corresponding to v. Since a(·) is a feasible solution, v ∈ T s only if v ∈ T s . Therefore, ∆ Border > 0. Intuitively, ∆ Border represents the maximum ∆ such that OP T a s (·) + ∆ · a(·) still satisfies all Border's constraints. Finally, note that the budget constraint is always satisfied since for a feasible solution, the increment of the payment is always non-positive.
Therefore, by setting ∆ = min(∆ IC , ∆ Border ), we have for all ∆ < ∆, OP T a s (·) + ∆ · a(·) is a feasible solution to the LP (RevOpt) on supply s + ∆.
Next, we show that if a (·) is not a feasible solution to the LP (OPTGrad), OP T a s (·) + ∆a (·) is infeasible to the LP (RevOpt) for any ∆ > 0:
s (v+1)+∆·a (v+1) for any ∆ > 0, violating the incentive compatibility;
• Recall that we assume the budget constraint is tight by OP T a For convenience, we say n
n is the Border's constraint corresponding to valuation v. Given supply s, we say that val-
We define the set of critical supplies as the ones where the gradient changes. 
We are interested in the size of the set C s and also in how we can compute this set efficiently. In particular, we characterize the gradient by an induction on C s . Our induction is based on the following condition for supply s ∈ C s , Condition 4.1. We say supply s ∈ C s satisfies Condition 4.1 if
• the budget constraint in LP (RevOpt) is tight by OP T a s (·);
• for v ∈ V , either OP T a s (v) = OP T a s (v − 1) or v binds the Border's constraint;
For the base case, we note that supply s B satisfies Condition 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. s = s
B satisfies Condition 4.1. Moreover, the auction uniformly allocates the item to the bidders in arg max i ν(v i ). Since ν(v) is monotonically increasing, we have ν(v) > ν(v − 1) for all v and the auction allocates the item to valuations higher than v − 1 once it exists. In other words, let V = {v ∈ V | v ≥ v}, the probability that a bidder with valuations in V gets the item equals to the probability that at least one bidder is with valuations in V . Thus, it binds the Border's constraint corresponding to v and for all ν(v) > 0, OP T a s (v) > 0. 
• the Border's constraint corresponding to R
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume g s (·) does not bind the budget constraint. Then, g s (·) must bind all the other constraints. However, note that LP (OPTGrad) contains a constraint a(v) ≤ a(v + 1) if and only if OP T a s (v) = OP T a s (v + 1) and LP (OPTGrad) contains a Border's constraint corresponding to valuation v if and only if v binds the Border's constraint for supply s. Therefore, g s (·) = OP T a s (·)/s, which must violate the budget constraint.
In the previous argument, if consider a (·) that binds all constraints except the budget constraint, such a (·) violates the budget constraint. For the sake of contradiction, assume g s (·) does not bind Border's constraint corresponding to v = R s min , but binds all other constraints. Note that, for such g s (·), we have for all v < v, g
To make sure that g s (·) binds the budget constraint, we must have
However, since a (·) binds the Border's constraint corresponding to R s min , such g s (·) must violate the Border's constraint corresponding to R s min .
Finally, for the sake of contradiction, assume g
and for all v < v + 1, g s (v ) = 0 since at most one constraint does not bind. Consider g (·) = g s (·) except g (v + 1) = g (v + 1) − ∆ and g (v) = g (v) + ∆ with ∆ < g (v + 1). It can be verified that g (·) is a feasible solution to the LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to supply s. We show that g (·) has higher revenue than g s (·). Note that the difference of the revenue between g (·) and g s (·) is
By Lemma 4.3, the remaining candidate constraints that g s (·) does not bind are:
We rule out the third possibility using the induction.
Condition 4.2. We say supply s ∈ C s satisfies Con-
Since the virtual valuation is monotonically increasing, OP T a 
This leads to two types of gradients. 
• g s (·) binds the Border's constraint corresponding to v p and the budget constraint. 
, which chooses a value to ensure that g s (·) binds the budget constraint.
To prove these two lemmas, note that in both cases, there are many Border's constraints and monotonicity constraints (a(v) ≤ a(v +1)) that are tight by both g s (·) and OP T a s (· 
Subtracting the above two equations, we have 
, which implies that g s (·) violates the budget constraint.
The proof for the Type II gradient follows along almost the same lines, and is omitted for brevity. Recall that LP (OPTGrad) contains exactly |V | + 1 constraints for s ∈ C s . For Type I gradients, note that the gradient binds all other constraints except the Border's constraint corresponding to v * . Therefore, as supply increases by ∆, LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to s+∆ contains exactly |V | constraints while the gradient binds exactly these |V | constraints. Therefore, the gradient does not change until an additional constraint is tight. Let the next critical supply beŝ = inf{s ∈ C s | s > s}. The next lemma demonstrates that the next tight constraint is OP T aŝ(v * − 1) = OP T aŝ(v * ) for Type I gradients. By a similar argument, for Type II gradients, the next tight constraint is the Border's constraint corresponding to the valuation v * . It immediately follows thatŝ satisfies Condition 4.1. To finish the induction, we show thatŝ satisfies Condition 4.2: the gradient gŝ(·) must bind the constraint a(v) < a(v+1) for OP T aŝ(v) = OP T aŝ(v+1) > 0. The proof is based on a contradiction argument. Assume gŝ does not bind a(v) < a(v + 1) for OP T aŝ(v) = OP T aŝ(v + 1) > 0. Note that since OP T aŝ(v) = OP T aŝ(v + 1) > 0, it implies that there exists a supply s <ŝ such that its gradient g s (·) satisfies g s (v) > g s (v + 1). We argue that g s (·) generates more revenue than gŝ(·), and moreover, for sufficiently small ε > 0, (1 − ε)g s (·) + ε · gŝ(·) is a feasible solution to LP (OPTGrad). This contradicts the fact that gŝ(·) is the optimal solution of LP (OPTGrad).
To formally prove that the next critical supplyŝ satisfies Condition 4.2, we require the following lemma, which demonstrates that the Type I gradient g s (·) not only satisfies Border's constraints appearing in the LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to s but also all other Border's constraints. Proof. Similar to Definition 4.3, define R as the set of representative valuations of g(·) and For each v ∈ R, let L(v) be the set of valuations that share the same value in g(·) with v.
Then, by the fact that g(·) satisfies Border's constraint for v, we have
and the fact that g(·) satisfies Border's constraint for v = inf{v ∈ R | v > v}, we have
(ifv does not exists, the above inequality still holds since F R = 0 and C = 0).
n is a concave function in terms of x, we have for any 0 ≤ x ≤ F L ,
Notice that for all v < v <v, we have 0 ≤ We argue that gŝ(·) is a feasible solution of LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to supply s * . First gŝ(·) satisfies the budget constraint. Moreover, by Lemma 4.7, LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to supply s * contains less monotonicity constraints a(v) ≤ a(v + 1), and by Lemma 4.9, gŝ(·) satisfies all Border's constraints in LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to supply s * . Therefore, since g s * (·) is the optimal solution of LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to supply s * , g s * (·) has higher revenue than gŝ(·).
Therefore, (1 − ε) · gŝ(·) + ε · g s * has higher revenue than gŝ(·), contradicting the fact that gŝ(·) is the optimal solution of LP (OPTGrad) corresponding to supplyŝ. Now, we are ready to bound the number of critical supplies. Note that a Type I gradient g s (·) is a gradient that does not bind the Border's constraint corresponding to some valuation v * . By Lemma 4.7, the gradient changes only when v * shares the same value as v * − 1 in OP T aŝ(·). Moreover, by Lemma 4.8, v * and v * − 1 will share the value for all s >ŝ. Furthermore, only a Type II gradient can introduce a new Border's constraint to LP (OPTGrad) by Lemma 4.7. In summary, each valuation can be a new valuation to bind the Border's constraint at most once. Once it pools with another valuation and shares the same value in the allocation rule, these valuations remain the same for all future supplies. Therefore, there are at most 2|V | different gradients. To efficiently obtain C s , we can compute the gradient g s (·) first by LP (OPTGrad) and then compute the next time when the gradient changes by Lemma 4.7.
Optimal Competitive Auction.
Since there are at most 2|V | different gradients, there are at most 2|V | critical supplies that we need to check in the linear program. More precisely, we can restrict our attention to the auction in which the gradients are the same for the supplies between two critical supplies. Let A = {s ∈ C s | s ≤ S} ∪ {S} and let s p = sup{s < s | s ∈ A ∪ {0}} be the critical supply right before s. Denote their difference d(s) = s − s p . Then, we can compute an interim supply-monotone auction with a tight competitive ratio using LP (onlineOPT).
The correctness of the algorithm and the time complexity are summarized in the following theorem. while for v ∈ L s (v * ), 
Thus, for any combination of F L , F n , F R , there exists an n 0 (F L , F n , F R ) such that for all n > n 0 (F L , F n , F R ),
Since there are only finitely many combinations of F L , F n , F R , if let n * 0 = max F L ,Fn,F R n 0 (F L , F n , F R ), then for all n > n * 0 , we have ∀s, ε · a (·) + (1 − ε) · b (·)/s ≥ (1 − ε)g s n (·).
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a succinct and efficiently implementable characterization of supply-monotonicity and designed an efficient algorithm to compute the auction for symmetric bidders in Bayesian settings. We also provide evidence that the revenue loss caused by supply-monotonicity is relatively small. Experimental evidence (see Appendix B) suggests that even for modest number of bidders, the competitive ratio is quite high (larger than 0.95 for all our experiments). A natural direction for future work is to show that for any number of bidders, the revenue loss caused by supply monotonicity is small. Another interesting direction is to extend our results to asymmetric bidders and/or private budgets. Our succinct characterizations extend to asymmetric bidders, but the revenue-optimizing auction uses the structure of the offline optimal auction for symmetric bidders. Private budgets are more challenging, in that they create an additional layer of possible misreporting for strategic gains, and as such, appear to be beyond current techniques in this line of research.
